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I.1 The motivation for and description of the present volume
It has proven surprisingly difficult for psychologists to find unanimous or even unambiguous answers to seemingly simple questions like 'When do infants and children understand intentions or beliefs?' or 'Do primates share intentions with others when they gesture?' or even 'Is this phenomenon best explained by conditioning or high-order cognitive processes?' One reason for this is healthy scientific debate concerning whether a particular gesture or class of gestures truly requires the coordination of intentional behaviour between interlocutors, or whether grounds for belief or other higher-order psychological concepts are satisfied in a particular research theoretical framework. However, another reason, one that we believe to be causing considerable nuisance in contemporary social and behavioural science research, is non-scientific. The root problem is the lack of consideration for the meanings of concepts that are in play in such work and the philosophical positions that are taken, explicitly or otherwise, by the researchers who interpret such psychological terms in particular ways.
We organized the present volume, A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology , so that philosophers and scientists could describe and apply a form of conceptual analysis, often associated with the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, to historical and contemporary psychological empirical research and theory construction. Our expectation was that such a volume would help to clarify the application of particular scientific concepts while providing sufficient background to enable researchers to employ these methods in their particular research areas. A further motivation for the volume was Introduction: Conceptual Analysis and Psychology: An Overview Timothy P. Racine and Kathleen L. Slaney to contribute to and extend Wittgensteinian scholarship concerning psychology as a discipline. As such, this volume introduces and explicitly discusses the relevance of Wittgenstein and conceptual analysis in general for psychologists. In particular, it provides a description of psychological issues of interest to Wittgenstein and examples of conceptual analytic work -a rough set of methods for use in diagnosing and remediating research problems stemming from unclear or hasty uses of scientific concepts.
Wittgenstein wrote extensively on the philosophical foundations of psychology and the classification of psychological concepts in particular in the last few years of his life (e.g. RPP I, RPP II, PPF, OC). Although his discussions of, for example, William James, Wolfgang Köhler or his allusions to behaviourism or Freud might seem anachronistic to contemporary psychologists, as this volume will show, the ways of thinking that are exposed by his analysis are very much with us today. In fact, the contributors to the present volume, a distinguished group of philosophers and social and behavioural scientists, have all published substantial amounts of work documenting that this is the case. The contributors include Alan Costall, Hans-Johann Glock, Nicole Hausen and Michel ter Hark, Daniel Hutto, Oskari Kuusela, Michael Maraun, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, John Preston and Severin Schroeder, Diane Proudfoot, Joachim Schulte, Stuart Shanker and Devin Casenhiser, Wes Sharrock and Leonidas Tsilipakos, Michael Tissaw, and Meredith Williams, and the editors, Tim Racine and Kate Slaney. We are particularly privileged that P. M. S. Hacker, one of the world's foremost authorities on Wittgenstein, has provided the prologue to this collection.
It was our intent that this collection of chapters would span a fairly heterogeneous set of topics, thereby demonstrating the relevance that Wittgenstein has for contemporary work in the social and behavioural sciences. The volume begins with Hutto, who makes an impassioned case for the importance of conceptual work in psychology that he proceeds to apply to debates concerning folk psychology, a research area that attempts to account for commonsense concepts of mind such intention, desires and beliefs. Kuusela takes Hutto's plea for conceptual analysis as an invitation to explain, in more general terms, what conceptual analysis is and the issues it raises. The two chapters that follow, by Schulte, and Hausen and ter Hark, respectively, can be thought of as exemplary case studies in method that build upon Kuusela's preparatory work. Schulte's exegetical analysis of two oft-cited fragments concerning the relation between the body and soul demonstrate a familiar theme in Wittgenstein's work, namely the relation between the inner and outer. The centrality of internal relations is a theme picked up as well in Hausen and ter Hark's Wittgensteinian analysis of aspect seeing in Gestalt psychology.
With exposure to, and demonstration of, Wittgenstein's methods well in hand, Williams compares and contrasts the foundations of mathematics and psychology through an analysis of their respective uses of propositions and norms. Glock continues this expanding of focus to the tricky issue of what we can say of animal minds and argues for a form of 'impure conceptual analysis' that includes empirical and methodological considerations. The theme of mental life continues in MoyalSharrock's analysis of John Searle's influential philosophy of mind, with particular attention paid to its causal and representational underbelly. Searle's philosophy is also a topic that is central in Proudfoot's examination of human-computer interaction and the extent to which robots can satisfy the grounds for the attribution of emotional states. The relation between behavioural expression and internal state continues in Sharrock and Tsilipakos' critical analysis of Margaret Archer's theory of internal conversation.
The next five chapters of the volume concern relatively more constrained psychological research areas. Shanker and Casenhiser discuss self-regulation in both a historical and modern context and display current unclarities in contemporary work in this area. Maraun scrutinizes the coherence of the classification of suicide in order to critique confusion between causes and reasons that appears in much of this literature. Preston and Schroeder discuss the extent to which neuroscientific evidence can be marshalled in favour of a representational theory of perception. Racine and Slaney consider social psychological theories that seek to explain why persons find death a fairly terrifying idea. Tissaw reviews popular methods in developmental psychology that are often claimed to show that human infants have complex, yet pre-linguistic, forms of understanding. In the final chapter, Costall conducts a more historical analysis of the same sorts of conclusions and shows why cognitivist forms of explanation remain very influential, despite their reliance on the sort of inner-outer dichotomization that Wittgenstein calls into question.
Because Hacker has detailed, in a very clear and compelling manner, many implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy and methods for psychology in his prologue, in the remainder of this introduction we thought it would be helpful to say a few words for those who know very little about Wittgenstein, or know some but wish to know more. We hope that this will serve as a backbone for the themes developed in the prologue and more generally throughout the book.
I.2 Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis in broad strokes
What is conceptual analysis, and how might it be helpful to social and behavioural scientists? As the volume will suggest, there is not a single or straightforward answer to these questions. However, in our view the most important aspect of conceptual analysis for Wittgenstein is not so much to follow some prescribed set of general methods but rather to development a certain attitude to philosophical puzzles, including those that arise in psychology. Not an attitude of suspicion, dogmatism or scepticism, but of curiosity, open-mindedness and scrupulous attention to detail. Although it is common, to speak of Wittgenstein's philosophy as containing a set of methods, which it surely does, we would suggest that these methods are a consequence of the Wittgensteinian attitude toward paying careful attention to the concepts that feature in our empirical work and theories.
Many attitudes, however, take time to develop, and there are specific steps one can take if attempting a conceptual analysis of a particular psychological issue. In our view, it might go roughly as follows. Perhaps the first step is to compare uses of the concept(s) in question in order to determine whether researchers are using terms in an ordinary everyday sense, a non-ordinary sense (i.e. using a familiar term in an unfamiliar or perhaps highly restricted manner, but without providing an explicit definition of the alternative use) or a more technical manner (i.e. by means of an explicit technical definition). This is not to lay down rigid rules for the use of the concepts in our languages, but rather to determine what the authors mean by the term(s) employed and how reasonable their claims are in light of their stated goals and/or definitions. For, as Wittgenstein states (PI, §130), 'language-games are rather set up as "objects of comparison" which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities'. (See further discussion by Oskari Kuusela, this volume.) This is not to say that Wittgenstein was much of a pluralist though, for as he remarks later in the Investigations:
[His] aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense. (PI, §464)
The second step will often involve distinguishing atypical or obscure uses of concepts -which will likely have relatively clear theoretical or practical consequences -from idiosyncratic uses on the parts of particular researchers, in which the term in question is used in a casual and relatively innocuous manner. Obviously, it is far from innocuous to base an entire theory on a foundation of conceptual sand that, in turn, leads to an unclear empirical program of work that ultimately shows up in a feature article in the science section of the New York Times . However, it is probably pretty harmless for a researcher studying basic attentional processes to use the concept 'attention' in a restricted manner in the study of, say, eye-tracking behaviour in human children as an end in itself. A final and additional and important step is often to clarify what the researcher seems to mean to say and saying it for him or her. When viewed in this light, Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis seems to be just a commonsense approach to science, which, in our opinion, it is.
I.2.1 But that is not the Wittgenstein I've heard about
Those with some previous familiarity with Wittgenstein, particularly his remarks concerning psychology, might be struggling to reconcile the view they might already have of Wittgenstein with the one just presented. After all, did he not remark that 'The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"' and that 'in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion' (PPF, §371)? (See Hutto's chapter in the present volume for further analysis of these remarks and also Hacker in his prologue.) However, it is critical to understand why Wittgenstein wrote these things and what he meant by them. Although we will make a few preliminary expansions on these topics presently, we hope that this volume in its entirety will provide the appropriate corrective.
First, Wittgenstein is pointing out, by responding to an implicit claim by Köhler, that the historical origins and research practices of psychology in Wittgenstein's time are not comparable to those of physics, which to our eyes seems hardly a controversial contention. The subject matter of psychology, for the most part, requires the use of a familiar set of everyday concepts (e.g. intention, belief, emotion, thought, helped, cooperated) that have quite complex and crisscrossing fields of use. (In Wittgenstein's terms, they have complicated grammars .) For example, the sense in which a psychologist observes another's intentions is conceptually distinct from the way that a physicist observes quarks in a particular accelerator. Now, to be fair, not everyone would agree with this, and some urge that a reduction of psychology to biology and ultimately physics is not only a possible but also a laudable goal. However, as Moyal-Sharrock implies in her contribution to the present volume, there are far-reaching consequences to whether one agrees that psychological concepts like 'intentions' are ultimately like physical objects. In any everyday sense, they certainly are not. This is not say that they do not in some sense have physical causes, but that is another matter. In either case, in Wittgenstein's view, and indeed in that of the contributors to the present volume, the sorts of discoveries that are made in the social and behavioural sciences are, for the most part, the result of determining the empirical character of familiar phenomena that have pre-existing meanings. Physics, on the other hand, requires a technical vocabulary to represent unexpected objects of inquiry such as 'dark matter' and, more historically, familiar ones like 'electron.' Second, with respect to the issue of Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical or, perhaps more accurately, non-theoretical attitude, it seems to us that it is a consequence of a form of what might be called ' particularism'. In The Blue and Brown Books (BBB, p. 18), he cautions against holding a 'contemptuous attitude towards the particular case.' By contrast, in the social and behavioural sciences the adequacy of an explanation is often understood to be a function of its generality. To see Wittgenstein's point, because it is a topic that shows up in a variety of chapters, we will now consider the example of a 'representation' and briefly discuss what is known as the 'representational theory of mind' (RTM). (For more detail, see chapters in the present volume by Costall, Hutto, Moyal-Sharrock, Preston and Schroeder, Proudfoot, and Racine and Slaney.)
To be exceedingly brief, RTM is essentially a theory or set of theories that posit (mental) intermediaries whose role is to represent to agents, via symbols, the objects or states of affairs that they perceive in the external world. This, then, is a theory in the most general sense; it stipulates that it is the general case that mental representations of the external world must occur in order for interaction with the world to occur. The idea of a must -indeed, a metaphysical mustis precisely to hold a 'contemptuous attitude towards the particular case.' By contrast, Wittgenstein would urge that one consider whether the grounds for mental representation are satisfied in the particular case. This brings us full circle to how it is that we say that an agent is, for example, thinking. For Wittgenstein, in third-person cases we typically use the circumstances in which particular behaviours are embedded (Proudfoot, this volume); in first-person cases, it is sincere first-person expressions of thought that are at issue. (For more exposition concerning first-versus-third person asymmetry, see chapters by Glock, Hacker, and Maraun.) Now, in typical cases, we say someone is thinking because they either express the object of their thoughts or they show that, or even what, they are thinking in how they behave, given an appropriate circumstance. Are we licensed here to speak of representation in some general sense? It is not clear what would be gained. However, there might particular cases , where we might be licensed. One example might be someone studying a map and then using it to get around a neighbourhood. Or a person might say they are thinking about their vacation last year when they visited some interesting ruins and are recounting it in some detail. These are mundane cases of mental representation that Wittgenstein would have no trouble with at all. Therefore, if the reader has heard that Wittgenstein is some sort of anti-mentalist, the reader has been mislead. The trouble Wittgenstein would have with mentalism is the metaphysical must -the general theoretical claim that such all processes of psychological interest can be simplified and unified in this sense. To do so would distort their meaning and alter the very lives that we live. Wittgenstein would also have considerable difficulty with the idea that interesting psychological behaviour is the necessary causal outcome of representational processes that seem to be mere redescriptions of the phenomena of interest.
I.3 Conclusion and two cautions
We believe that the set of chapters presented in the collection will provide a spur for some fresh work in psychology and the social and behavioural sciences more generally. We do wish to conclude our brief overview with two cautionary notes for those who are interested in welcoming Wittgensteinian methods of conceptual analysis into their areas of psychological research interest.
First, it is sometimes claimed that Wittgenstein advocates a certain style of psychology. For example, Harré and Tissaw (2005) argue that Wittgenstein's philosophy implies a new paradigm that is discursive. If Wittgenstein's goal though were primarily to dissolve philosophical puzzles through adopting a particular attitude and set of methods, why would this directly imply anything about the general ontological status of psychology? It certainly would not mean that experimental research is somehow suspect and that discursive work should replace it. (Of course, not all empirical questions are amenable to experimental analysis, and not all phenomena of psychological interest are necessarily measurable either, but this seems a far cry from closing up the laboratory in favour of discursivism.) Hutto (this volume) defends experimental work -for well-formed questions -and there is ample evidence in Wittgenstein's own work that he had no animus toward experimentation. In our view, at best, these suggestions should be taken to call into question the dichotomization of the inner and the outer that is essentially institutionalized in many, but not all areas, of psychology. However, one should not lose sight of the fact of that the inner is not the outer, as is sometimes suggested as well, for example, in some species of distributed cognition; Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis should help us see the internal relations between inner and outer, body and mind, but to help us not collapse the one to the other.
Another way that Wittgenstein is sometimes potentially misconstrued in psychology in our view is by incorporating his ideas into individual psychological theories. This is understandable to some degree because Wittgenstein (Z, §412) asks himself questions like 'Am I doing child psychology?' However, to use Wittgenstein as a basis for psychological theorizing is to miss much of the motivation for the present volume. Wittgenstein provides a way of thinking and a set of methods for dissolving philosophical confusions, including those that occur in (child) psychology. And, to return to this quote from Zettel , Wittgenstein answers the rhetorical 'Am I doing child psychology?' by claiming he is 'making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning' (Z, §412).
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